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ABBREVIATIONS*
€ Euro
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCB Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
bn Billions
bp Basis points
CBE Banco de España Circular
CBSO Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDOs Collateralised debt obligations
CDS Credit Default Swap
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
CIs Credit institutions
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs Deposit institutions
ECB European Central Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EU European Union
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
FSR Financial Stability Report
FVCs Financial vehicle corporations
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GVA Gross value added
GVAmp Gross value added at market prices
IAS International Accounting Standards
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
LBOs Leveraged buy-out operations
LGD Loss given default
LTV Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
m Millions
MEFF Mercado Español de Futuros y Opciones (Spanish Financial Futures and Options Market)
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
PD Probability of default
PER Price earnings ratio
pp Percentage points
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWA Risk-weighted assets
SCIs Specialised credit institutions
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIVs Structured investment vehicles
SPV Special-purpose vehicle
TA Total assets
VaR Value at risk
WTO World Trade Organisation
* The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of the 
 Financial Stability Report.
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Overview
Since the last Financial Stability Report (FSR) the international economic and financial environ-
ment has been particularly convulsed, while in the Spanish economy the adjustment initiated 
in 2007 has intensified. Spanish deposit institutions have thus pursued their activity under 
considerably more difficult conditions than those prevailing six months ago.
In the international arena the most complex crisis witnessed in recent decades is under way, 
which has led the governments of many developed economies to take exceptional and force-
ful measures to redress the situation. The US Federal Reserve helped arrange the acquisition 
by JP Morgan of the investment bank Bear Stearns in March, given the impossibility of the 
latter raising funds on the wholesale markets. And subsequently, the US Treasury had to 
place under administration the government-sponsored mortgage finance agencies (Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae). The difficulties did not end there, and there have been notable bank-
ruptcies (with Lehman Brothers to the fore) and bank consolidation processes, affecting in-
vestment (Merrill Lynch) and commercial (Washington Mutual and Wachovia) banks alike. 
Tensions have spread to other sectors, making intervention by the authorities necessary in 
one of the biggest insurance companies in the world, American International Group (AIG). 
These episodes have also impacted other regions, including most notably – at the time of this 
FSR going to press – many European countries where certain major banks have been as-
sailed by difficulties.
Although Spanish banks have not been directly affected by the US subprime market crisis, like 
other banking systems they must nevertheless face the difficulties associated with the bleaker 
economic situation and with the tightening of financing conditions on wholesale markets. In 
the face of a highly complex international setting, Spanish deposit institutions have reacted by 
beginning to restructure their balance sheets. On one hand, they are reducing their exposure 
to the sectors in which credit had grown most intensely in the past. On the liabilities side, fixed-
term deposits are growing sharply. This restructuring of bank balance sheets, which naturally 
requires some time, is being accompanied by sound short-term results, by high starting levels 
for provisions for doubtful assets and by capital ratios far above the required minimum. None-
theless, a crisis such as that beleaguering the international financial system coupled with the 
continuing lack of liquidity in the wholesale financing markets, set against the progressive use 
Spanish banks had made of these markets in recent years, all means that the Spanish banking 
sector faces additional factors of difficulty in the coming years.
In the light of the exceptional events that have unfolded, especially since late September and 
early October, the governments of many countries, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the euro area members, have coordinated their actions to adopt a series of 
measures aimed at reactivating markets and increasing confidence. Given the notable force-
fulness of the measures, the situation of high instability on the financial markets is expected 
progressively to resume a normal footing. That said, if the implementation of the general frame-
work agreed by the various governments were to take the form of the recapitalisation, through 
direct government aid, of institutions that apparently do not have solvency problems, that 
would introduce distortions insofar as the differences between those institutions that have 
made mistakes and those that have better managed the international financial crisis tend to 
disappear. Accordingly, these measures should be applied giving due regard to transparency 
and a level playing field.
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In line with economic developments, bad debts have grown sharply since the last FSR. That 
said, behind this trend, which had been foreseen and which will persist in the coming months, 
are a series of diverse and simultaneous factors, including most notably the deterioration in the 
macroeconomic situation and higher interest rates. The greater prudence enshrined in Banco 
de España Accounting Circular 4/2004, which entails the earlier and fuller recognition of doubt-
ful assets, and the incentives introduced by the new Bankruptcy Law also explain, and will 
continue to do so, the level and the rate of increase of doubtful assets ratios. The regulatory 
changes mean that, at the same pace the economy worsens, higher levels and a faster rate of 
increase in the doubtful assets ratio will be seen. 
To withstand the increase in bad debts, Spanish banks have a general provision that provides 
for high coverage of doubtful assets. As bad debts carry on growing, as a result of further 
deterioration in the economy, the funds set aside will progressively be used. In any event, the 
doubtful assets coverage ratios need not cover all the risk, only the final loss that is to arise. In 
practice, this means that coverage ratios of around 50% are normal for coping with actual 
losses. In short, current coverage rates, at around 100%, may be expected to converge on 
these levels, which are consistent with those in other developed countries’ banking systems. 
In any case, continuing revenues from the traditional retail business, and the availability of 
guarantees, provide additional factors of flexibility for managing credit risk.
During this last year, Spanish deposit institutions, like those of other banking systems, have 
had difficulty gaining access to the wholesale funding markets, against a background of nota-
ble liquidity tensions. However, Spanish banks were able to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties that intermittently opened up in the market, in particular in the second quarter of 2008. But 
at the time of this FSR going to press, these difficulties have worsened considerably as liquid-
ity has dried up on numerous funding markets at the international level.
A defining characteristic of the funding Spanish banks have obtained over recent years, and 
which has enabled them to finance a portion of the growth of their credit, is that it is centred 
on lengthy maturities. Thus, the outstanding balance of medium and long-term issues is more 
than sixfold the outstanding balance of short debt, while under the former, 60% of maturities 
are after 2013. In any event, given the persistence of the tensions on international wholesale 
markets, Spanish deposit institutions have reacted by restructuring their liabilities, and in par-
ticular by notably stepping up the raising of fixed-term deposits. This reinforcement of their 
traditionally sound deposit base has largely been possible thanks to the type of retail business 
in which they engage, which is based on proximity to the customer and on building long-term 
relationships. It should likewise be recalled that Spanish deposit institutions participate very 
actively in the distribution of investment funds and life insurance, which enables them to tailor 
their range of savings products to market circumstances with greater flexibility. As indicated, 
the continuing lack of liquidity on international financial markets poses major management dif-
ficulties for Spanish banks. However, the approval of a common framework for action by the 
euro area countries should help alleviate such difficulties.
Liquidity obtained from the Eurosystem, which has increased since the start of the difficulties 
on international financial markets in 2007, accounts for a very small proportion of bank bal-
ance sheets (1.39%), while it is in line with the size of the Spanish economy in the euro area. 
This is so even considering the measure approved by the ECB on 15 October, whereunder all 
the liquidity requested by credit institutions will be granted at a fixed rate. What is more, bear-
ing in mind the liquidity extended by the Eurosystem in different currencies, and not only in 
euro, the relative weight of that applied for by the Spanish banking system, in relation to its 
size, has fallen.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2008
Despite the setting of greater international complexity described and the deceleration of the 
Spanish economy in the first half of 2008, Spanish banks’ income statements have performed 
favourably. This is due above all to the fact that revenues from the traditional retail business 
characterising Spanish banks’ income statements have held up. Also, solvency ratios are 
holding at levels well above the regulatory minimum required, and this bearing in mind the 
prudence with which the the transition to the new solvency regulation arising from the entry 
into force of the Capital Requirements Directive is being implemented.
In sum, we are facing an unprecedented international financial crisis which is developing in a 
greatly weakened macroeconomic environment. In recent years the Spanish banking system 
has reinforced its control mechanisms and risk management, its profitability, its efficiency and 
its solvency. Although this places it in a sound starting position, the Spanish banking industry 
has to face significant challenges which will affect its earnings-generating ability in the coming 
quarters.
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1 Macroeconomic risks and financial markets
Since the last Financial Stability Report (FSR) the international economic and financial environ-
ment in which Spanish banks operate has been exceptionally complex, with recurrent epi-
sodes of pronounced financial instability, both in the United States and in Europe. In the inter-
national financial arena, tensions have worsened on money and credit markets (see Charts 
1.1.A and B), with stock market prices falling, marked increases in volatility, rises in risk premi-
ums and higher demand by institutional investors for government debt. July marked an end to 
the decoupling of the emerging markets from the poor performance of the developed coun-
tries seen until then (see Charts 1.2.A and B). The international macroeconomic setting was 
characterised by a significant economic slowdown in Q2, markedly so in the developed econ-
omies, and a downward revision of growth forecasts that heighten the risk of exacerbating 
what are already sizeable difficulties in the financial sphere.
In the United States there has been a further deterioration in the housing market, where falling 
prices persist (the S&P Case-Shiller index for 20 major areas showed a year-on-year decline of 
15.9% in September), and in the mortgage market, where the default rate has grown to 6.41% 
of all mortgages, while foreclosures have increased. These factors have meant further losses 
in subprime mortgage-backed assets, even for the high-grade tranches, affecting the results 
of banks and insurance companies most negatively, and obliging them to recapitalise in a very 
adverse financial setting.
The financing conditions on wholesale markets have tightened notably, with bouts in which it 
has been most difficult – if not impossible – for certain key institutions in the United States and 
in some European countries to obtain funding. Indeed, the set of institutions affected has been 
progressively widening, giving rise to nationalisations, bankruptcies, interventions and to the 
adoption of exceptional measures on the functioning of markets, including most notably – as 
far as regulatory framework changes are concerned – the prohibition of short-selling of bank 
shares on stock markets.
The institutions affected in the United States encompass investment banks, whose business 
model has not survived the turmoil, other commercial banking institutions, the nation’s leading 
insurance company and one of the biggest in the world (AIG), and the government-sponsored 
mortgage agencies (Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae). Also affected were certain money market 
mutual funds. Subsequently, large banks in some European countries (United Kingdom, Ger-
many, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, among others) have also become 
embroiled in these episodes of severe instability.
The seriousness of the situation has prompted the adoption of exceptional and unprecedented 
measures by governments. This has been so in the United States, where the Treasury pro-
posed a far-reaching programme that was subsequently ratified by the Senate and Congress, 
and in Europe, where action by the British government and by the euro area countries has 
been proposed.1
Central banks, particularly since late September and early October, have intermediated with 
greater intensity than had habitually been the case in the provision of liquidity, to the extent that 
they have decided to grant liquidity with no ceiling on the amount requested provided, as is 
The external environment is 
in a particularly complex 
situation, with recurrent 
episodes of financial 
instability and a worsening 
macroeconomic outlook.
The US and European 
authorities had to intervene 
in key financial institutions, 
while there were 
bankruptcies, mergers and 
acquisitions among some 
banks and nationalisations 
of others.
1. Box 1.1 shows the sequence of events which, with increasing speed, have unfolded recently.
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BOX 1.1
Since the onset of financial turbulence in summer 2007, bouts of 
heightened financial instability have intensified, to the extent that in 
recent months numerous financial institutions have been subject to 
nationalisations, bankruptcies and interventions. Also, a situation that 
had initially emerged abruptly in the United States has also spread to 
the banking systems of certain European countries, especially in 
Central Europe and in the United Kingdom.
In response to the virulence of the events, various governments, with 
differing degrees of intensity, have taken measures to try to restore 
confidence in their financial systems, while central banks have taken 
coordinated action to limit the malfunctioning of certain markets, in 
particular the interbank market.
This box sets out chronologically the main events that have occurred 
since the beginning of September.
7 September: as a result of the deterioration of the US mortgage 
market, the mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were 
brought under the control of the US Treasury.
15 September: the US investment banks Lehman Brothers and Mer-
rill Lynch fail to withstand the impact of the subprime market crisis; 
the former files for bankruptcy and the latter is acquired by bank of 
America.
17 September: the Federal Reserve rescues American International 
Group (AIG), the country’s leading insurance company and one of the 
largest in the world, which had announced two days earlier that it 
needed a large amount of capital. The intervention is justified by the 
impact that the bankruptcy of a company that has participated very 
actively in selling protection through credit default swaps (CDS) would 
have on the markets.
16-18 September: in the United States various money market funds 
are affected by the strains.
17 September: the difficulties suffered by the UK’s largest mortgage 
lender (HBOS) eventually lead to its takeover by another British bank, 
Lloyds TSB.
19 September: given the seriousness of the almost constant stream 
of events, the US Treasury, in coordination with the Federal Reserve, 
proposes a rescue plan for the financial industry, involving withdrawal 
of the illiquid mortgage assets that are causing the losses to financial 
institutions. Following a long and complex passage through Con-
gress, in which the plan at first failed to gain approval, on 2 October 
it is ratified by the Senate, which also approves an expansion of de-
posit insurance coverage.
21 September: the two US investment banks that have not filed for 
bankruptcy or been taken over by other institutions abandon the in-
vestment banking model and become commercial banks.
25 September: the largest US savings bank, Washington Mutual, files 
for bankruptcy and is taken over, with the agreement of the authori-
ties, by JP Morgan.
28 September: as a result of the collapse in Fortis shares, the Bel-
gian, Dutch and Luxembourg authorities agree to intervene, taking a 
stake in this institution.
29 September: in the United States the fifth largest commercial bank, 
Wachovia, goes bankrupt and falls into the hands of Citigroup. Sub-
sequently it opens negotiations with Wells Fargo, leading Citigroup to 
take legal action. In the United Kingdom, following the nationalisation 
of Bradford & Bingley, the British authorities reach an agreement for it 
to be taken over by Banco Santander. In Germany, owing to its liquid-
ity problems, Hypo Real Estate Bank receives a credit line from a 
consortium of German banks. In Iceland, the government acquires 
75% of Glitnir Bank.
30 September: the Irish government guarantees all deposits for two 
years. The guarantee extends to covered bonds and senior and sub-
ordinated debt. Belgium, France and Luxembourg address the res-
cue of Dexia.
2 October: as indicated above, the US Senate ratifies the plan to 
rescue the financial system. In Europe, Greece guarantees all its de-
posits.
3 October: the Dutch government nationalises the Dutch part of For-
tis.
4-5 October: the initial rescue plan for Hypo Real Estate Bank fails 
and the government is forced to redesign it.
6 October: the persistence of the problems at Fortis leads to an agree-
ment for the French bank BNP Paribas to purchase Fortis in Belgium 
and Luxembourg, with the Belgian and Luxembourg governments 
maintaining blocking minority stakes. Belgium, and to a lesser extent 
Luxembourg, take stakes in the capital of BNP Paribas. The German 
and Dutch governments announce a 100% deposit guarantee.
7 October: Iceland nationalises its second largest bank (Landsbanki). 
The 27 EU finance ministers agree to increase the minimum amount 
covered by deposit guarantee funds to €50,000. The Spanish gov-
ernment announces an increase in the amount covered by the Span-
ish deposit guarantee fund to €100,000, along with the creation of a 
fund for the temporary acquisition of assets to boost the system’s li-
quidity.
8 October: the central banks of the main developed economies take 
coordinated action to reduce interest rates by 50 bp. The UK Treas-
ury announces a rescue plan for its banks, involving the provision of 
liquidity and capital, through the purchase of preference shares. 
Banque Populaire and Caisse d´Epargne, the French mutual bank 
group, announce merger talks.
9 October: Belgium, France and Luxembourg announce a new plan 
to assist Dexia, with a year-long bank guarantee. Iceland takes con-
trol of its largest domestic bank, Kaupthing.
12-13 October: the euro area Heads of State and Government agree 
a joint strategy to restore market confidence and the proper function-
THE MAIN RECENT EVENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
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natural, that the institution applying for the liquidity has the necessary collateral. Further, there 
have been significant changes to some central banks’ operations. These chiefly include the 
Federal Reserve, which set in place new credit facilities to broaden the spectrum of banks 
having access and the collateral eligible for financing operations, and, to a lesser extent, the 
Bank of England. As to monetary policy, the Federal Reserve cut its official interest rates by 
25 bp, placing the federal funds target rate at 2% on 30 April, while the Bank of England also 
cut rates by 25 bp to 5%. In this exceptional setting, the central banks of the main developed 
economies decided on 8 October to take concerted action to cut intervention rates by 50 bp. 
This unprecedented move, which did not initially succeed in unblocking the malfunctioning 
markets or in restoring confidence, should however have a positive outcome in the medium 
term, contributing to the better functioning of financial markets and to a progressive recovery 
in agents’ confidence.
On the economic front, US Q2 growth figures were stronger than expected (posting an an-
nualised quarterly rate of 2.8%) given the sound performance of exports and sustained private 
consumption, supported by tax breaks. However, a significant slowdown is expected in Q3, 
brought on by the reduction of the fiscal impulse, which might bear on consumption, and by a 
foreseeably lower contribution by the external sector. Japan posted a negative quarterly an-
nualised rate in Q2 (–3%), and the related rate in the United Kingdom dipped by 0.3 pp to 
+0.8%. The emerging economies saw a slowdown in activity although, with few exceptions, 
this has been limited. However, there are increasingly greater doubts about the ability of these 
economies to remain insulated from the severe instability on international financial markets 
and, therefore, to maintain such high growth rates as they had been recording.
There was a notable reduction in the pace of economic growth in the euro area in 2008 Q2. 
GDP shrank by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in this period (see Chart 1.3.A). This decline stemmed 
not only from the correction of certain factors that had exceptionally boosted the increase in 
output between January and March (a 0.7% increase), but also from the weaker external en-
vironment, from the notable tightening of financial conditions and from developments in oil and 
commodities prices. Against this background, the ECB revised its projections downwards last 
September, placing GDP growth in the euro area at between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2008, and 
between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009, with these figures subject to a sizeable degree of uncer-
tainty and to downside risks that have become accentuated in recent months.
The risks the international financial environment faces remain very high, and further bouts of 
financial instability with potentially systemic repercussions cannot be ruled out. The financial 
Economic growth in the 
main economies has been 
weaker than expected, with 
the exception of the United 
States, where growth 
proved high.
Central banks have provided 
liquidity and, in some cases, 
altered the operational 
framework to make access 
easier to new banks and to 
accept a wider range of 
collateral.
Economic growth in the 
euro area has felt the impact 
and future growth 
projections have been 
revised downwards.
ing of the financial system. In Spain, an extraordinary meeting of the 
Council of Ministers approves a set of measures in line with this joint 
strategy.
14 October: in the United States it is announced that the Treasury will 
inject capital into banks and will set mechanisms in place to guaran-
tee new bank debt issues.
15 October: proposal by the European Commission to amend the 
Directive regulating deposit guarantee schemes. The coverage 
level rises to €100,000 and the payout period is reduced to three 
days. The ECB announces that it will extend all the liquidity re-
quested by credit institutions at a fixed rate on an unlimited ba-
sis.
16 October: the Swiss government injects capital into UBS.
18-19 October: the Dutch government provides capital to ING.
21 October: the German bank Bayern LB requests assistance from 
the German government.
27 October: the Belgian government provides capital to KBC, one of 
the biggest Belgian banks.
THE MAIN RECENT EVENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (cont’d) BOX 1.1
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deleveraging process, which entails a reduction in the size of bank balance sheets and an at-
tempted shoring up of capital, is proving abrupt and, on occasions, disorderly. From a broader 
perspective, this process reflects a move towards a generalised reduction of financial interme-
diaries’ debt and less availability of credit, which is beginning to affect households and firms. 
The linkages between financial and economic factors might exacerbate the already fragile inter-
national financial situation. The coordinated measures adopted by the different authorities do 
not avert deleveraging, but they should contribute to ensuring that the process comes about in 
a more progressive and orderly fashion, alleviating the effects on the real sector.
In the Spanish economy, the adjustment begun in 2007 intensified. The quarter-on-quarter 
growth rate of GDP fell once again between April and June (0.1% against 0.8% recorded two 
quarters earlier; see Chart 1.3.A). In year-on-year terms, the rate of increase fell from 3.5% to 
1.8% over the same period. This performance was the result of the marked weakening of 
domestic demand, mainly of consumption but also of gross capital formation, against the 
The adjustment begun in 
the Spanish economy in 
2007 intensified,
The possibility of feedback 
effects between financial 
and real factors has 
increased.
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2. For greater details, see Martínez Pagés, J. (2008): “Encuesta sobre préstamos bancarios en España: julio de 2008”, 
Boletín Económico, September 2008.
background of high uncertainty associated with the continuing financial tensions and high fuel 
prices, which would have dented agents’ confidence. 
Weak economic growth and, in particular, the adjustment of the residential sector halted job 
creation in the first half of 2008. And combined with the increase in the labour force, this gave 
rise to a sharp employment adjustment, raising the unemployment rate to 10.4% in June 2008 
(11.33% in September 2008), on EPA figures, against 8.6% at end-2007.
Financing conditions for households and firms have continued to tighten. On one hand, banks 
have passed through the increase in money market interest rates to their lending transactions. 
And on the other, the Spanish bank lending survey (EPB by its Spanish abbreviation) suggests 
that financial institutions have applied stricter lending standards during the first half of the 
year.2 These tighter standards would be linked above all to the perceived deterioration both in 
the general economic outlook and in specific industries, and also to the impossibility of gaining 
access to the international wholesale bank financing markets, which have collapsed of late 
(see Chart 1.3.B). The plan announced by the international authorities, and in particular by the 
euro area countries, of which the Spanish government’s actions will be a part, should contrib-
ute to alleviating this factor of tension (see Box 1.2).
Against this backdrop of worsening confidence and the adjustment of financing conditions, 
credit to the non-financial private sector has continued to slow, meaning that its rate of expan-
prompting an increase in the 
unemployment rate.
Private-sector financing 
conditions continued to 
tighten …
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
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The events that have occurred in the financial system since late September and 
early October confirm the existence of a financial crisis of a complexity and 
virulence unseen in recent decades.
The monetary authorities and governments of various countries had already 
taken decisions, of greater or lesser significance, to restore confidence in finan-
cial markets and contribute to a return to their normal functioning prior to the 
events of the week 6-10 October (see Box 1.1). However, these events, and 
the accompanying worldwide stock market crash that week, led to the adop-
tion of an exceptional set of coordinated measures by the governments of the 
euro area countries at an emergency meeting held on Sunday 12 October.
These common measures were adopted by the euro area countries as part of 
the coordinated action by the governments of the main economic areas, in-
cluding the United States and United Kingdom. The measures, to be imple-
mented by each Member State in accordance with the particular features of its 
own banking system, are based on four general principles of action.
First, mechanisms have been designed to facilitate the funding of credit institu-
tions, given the persistent distortions that currently exist. Thus, apart from the 
endorsement of the action of certain governments in relation to the purchase of 
high-quality assets, governments are authorised to guarantee medium-term 
bank debt issuance. The debt must be senior debt with a maturity of up to five 
years, and the price of the instruments will at least reflect their value under 
normal market conditions. The scheme, which shall be limited in amount and 
temporary (lasting until 31 December 2009), is aimed at institutions operating in 
euro area countries (including foreign subsidiaries) provided they at least meet 
the regulatory capital requirements.
Second, the States may strengthen the capital of credit institutions, in particular 
tier 1 capital, through the acquisition of preference shares or some other similar 
instrument. Governments commit themselves to provide capital when needed, 
while favouring the raising of private capital.
Third, an explicit commitment has been made to avoid the failure of relevant fi-
nancial institutions. When taking action in this respect, States must be vigilant to 
ensure that the interests of taxpayers are protected and that assistance is ac-
companied by an appropriate restructuring plan for the institution in question.
Fourth, the competent authorities are urged to consider the need to ensure 
sufficient flexibility in the implementation of the accounting rules for valuation (in 
particular as regards the application of market value).
Finally, the mechanisms of vigilance and coordinated action between the 
various States and authorities of the European Union have been strength-
ened.
As a consequence of the framework for common action agreed by the euro area 
countries, the Spanish government, which had already taken the decision to 
extend the coverage of the deposit guarantee fund from €20,000 to €100,0001 
per depositor and institution and had established a scheme for the purchase of 
high-quality assets from institutions, for an overall amount of €30 billion, extend-
able to €50 billion,2 has announced the following measures:
– Government guarantees may be given for new debt issued by credit 
institutions. The amount of the scheme approved in 2008 is €100 billion. 
The maximum maturity of the issues will be five years, but the guarantee 
may also cover interbank deposits.
– Where necessary, securities may be acquired to recapitalise institutions, 
through instruments such as preference shares.3
All these exceptional measures are commensurate with the current scale of the 
crisis. Such exceptionality is manifest in the very mechanisms designed by govern-
ments, in their coordinated adoption by a large number of countries and in their 
envisaged maximum amount, which can be approximated indirectly by their weight 
in terms of GDP (see accompanying chart) or by other relevant variables, for in-
stance their weight relative to the financial system of the country in question. 
Although these measures are not having an immediate impact on returning 
markets to normality and restoring agents’ confidence, as they are progres-
sively applied they should conceivably alleviate the strains besetting the finan-
cial sector, while contributing to helping ensure that the adjustment, and there-
fore its impact on the real economy, is not as abrupt as it would otherwise be. 
Success will, however, also depend on the measures being implemented trans-
parently and without distorting the level playing field for competition, and with-
out hampering international financial market agents’ discriminating capacity in 
respect of banks. Thus, for example, the recapitalisation of banks that appar-
ently have no solvency problems might give rise to unwanted distortions in the 
degree of competition in the banking system and to the emergence of inap-
propriate incentives in bank management.
BOX 2.1EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EURO AREA COUNTRIES AND BY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT
MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED, AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (a)
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a. The term "maximum amount" reflects the maximum value that the measures adopted might reach, but not necessarily their actual value,
which will possibly be lower.
1. Royal Decree 1642/2008 of 10 October 2008. 2. Royal Decree Law 6/2008 of 10 Oc-
tober 2008. 3. Royal Decree Law 7/2008 of 13 October 2008.
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sion has drawn closer to that of nominal GDP, whereby debt ratios have tended to stabilise 
during the first half of the current year. However, the interest burden has once again increased 
as a result of the rise in average interest rates on outstanding loans, thus contributing to 
checking the growth of income. The rate of increase of household wealth has continued to 
ease as a consequence both of the unfavourable trend of financial asset prices and, to a 
greater extent, of house price dynamics.
In sum, the adjustment of the Spanish economy has intensified and quickened in the first half 
of 2008. Set against the international financial crisis, the current outlook points to the continu-
ation of this process, the depth of which is conditional upon the behaviour of employment. 
Households and firms are adapting to this situation, although the increase in financing costs 
and the weakening in activity may be expected to raise the proportion of agents under greater 
financial pressure. Further, given the Spanish economy’s high dependence on external saving, 
the prolongation of the financial turmoil is an additional factor of risk.
As a result of all these 
factors an increase is 
expected in the proportion 
of agents under greater 
financial pressure. Looking 
ahead, it is foreseen that the 
adjustment of the Spanish 
economy will continue, while 
the prolongation of the 
turmoil will remain a further 
factor of risk.
… contributing to easing the 
pace of household and 
corporate debt, although 
the associated interest 
burden continued to 
increase.
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2 Deposit institutions and other financial market participants
As noted in Chapter 1, the serious international financial instability problems and economic 
weakening make for a much more complex operating environment for financial institutions. 
Against this background, Spanish deposit institutions have begun to restructure their balance 
sheets. This is reflected in a slowdown in lending, most marked in credit to the real estate sec-
tor, as a result of lower demand and greater caution in loan approval because of the significant 
increase in credit risk attributable to the downturn in economic activity. Set against the difficul-
ties in gaining access to wholesale funding owing to the lack of liquidity on international finan-
cial markets, Spanish institutions have reacted by stepping up their efforts to attract deposits 
in their retail business. However, the lack of liquidity at the international level, which has be-
come more marked since mid-September, hampers the process of restructuring bank balance 
sheets, making it much slower. The plan designed by the euro area countries, in coordination 
with other international authorities, and of which the Spanish government’s proposals are a 
part, should contribute to improving this process (see Box 2.1).
The process of restructuring of banks’ balance sheets is made easier by sound income state-
ments, as these are based on a high percentage of recurring income from retail banking ac-
tivities and little dependence on business in the international financial markets. The greatest 
threat to bank earnings in the coming quarters is the growth of bad debts, although, as ex-
plained in previous FSRs, Spanish institutions have a general provision which will help to coun-
ter the impact of the increase in doubtful assets.
One fundamental aspect in the process of adjustment should, however, be the control and 
rationalisation of operating costs by Spanish banks. At the same time, this process should be 
assisted by the sound capital adequacy position, unlike what may occur in other banking sys-
tems where institutions are much more highly leveraged and the losses relating to complex, 
non-transparent instruments are more significant. 
Spanish deposit institutions have grown more moderately than in previous years. Consolidated 
balance sheets show a year-on-year increase in total assets of 8% in June 2008 (Table 2.1), 
basically due to the performance of business in Spain, as compared with the stagnation of 
business abroad. However, the growth of business in Spain (9.96%) slowed significantly with 
respect to June 2007 (20.1%).
The lower growth of total activity is explained by the continuing slowdown in financing to the 
private sector (credit and fixed income), which nevertheless grew at 9.5%, its weight slightly 
increasing in consolidated balance sheets. The trend towards lower lending growth, which has 
recently stepped up owing to the collapse of international financial markets and to the process 
of global deleveraging, will foreseeably persist in the coming quarters.
As noted in the last FSR, doubtful assets have grown sharply in total business. This surge is 
explained by the very low starting point of the doubtful assets ratios1, after a long, sustained 
period of economic growth. The increase in bad debts derives from a combination of various 
factors: the sharp growth of lending in the past, the recent behaviour of the real economy and 
of interest rates, and the changes introduced by Accounting Circular CBE 4/2004, which re-
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS
In a more complex 
economic and financial 
environment, Spanish 
deposit institutions are 
restructuring their balance 
sheets. Though this is a 
complex process given the 
international liquidity 
tensions,...
...it is supported by 
recurring income, and by 
the existence of a general 
provision in Spain.
A proper rationalisation of 
operating expenses and the 
sound capital adequacy 
position of Spanish banks 
should contribute to this 
process of adjustment.
Credit to the private sector 
continues to slow …
… and will foreseeably do 
so in the coming quarters.
1. In the FSR, the terms bad debts and doubtful assets are used as synonyms, although technically doubtful debts in-
clude others in addition to impaired assets.
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quire earlier and fuller recognition of doubtful assets than in the past. The default ratio in total 
business stands only at 1.3% (June 2008), but will continue growing in the coming quarters. 
However, the system of loan loss provisions in force in Spain, unlike those of other banking 
systems, ensures a high coverage of bad debts, which affords Spanish institutions greater 
room for manoeuvre, especially in the initial stages when doubtful assets are first starting to 
rise.
Turning to liabilities, the deposits of central banks grew sharply in June 2008. However, to as-
sess the liquidity which Spanish deposit institutions receive from the Eurosystem, regard must 
be had to the net loan (difference between the funds received in liquidity providing operations 
and those delivered in liquidity absorption operations), whose weight in bank balance sheets 
is very low (1.39%). Indeed, since December 2007, when it amounted to 1.33% of the con-
The liquidity obtained from 
the Eurosystem by Spanish 
institutions is small.
Various factors explain the 
growth in bad debts, the 
impact of which has been 
softened, particularly in the 
initial stages, by the 
provisions in place.
In the United States, securities market intermediaries (broker-dealers) 
are known as investment banks. Institutions such as Lehman Broth-
ers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns 
fell under this category. These investment banks would issue and buy 
securities on the securities markets and provide consultancy services 
to investors and advice on mergers and acquisitions. They were not 
deposit institutions but securities-dealer companies that financed 
themselves on the wholesale markets.
The distinction in the United States between investment banks and 
deposit institutions dates back to the 1929 crisis. The 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act prohibited deposit institutions from operating as invest-
ment banks and vice versa. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act 
provided for the creation of financial holding companies that could 
engage in the activities of deposit institutions, broker-dealers and in-
surance companies. 
There are major differences between US investment banks and Span-
ish broker-dealers which are imposed by the business engaged in. 
The attendant business in Spain focuses, in the main, on brokerage, 
with limited activity in dealing, while in the United States dealing was 
on an enormous scale, encompassing all types of strategies and tak-
ing advantage of solvency regulations that allowed very high levels of 
leverage.
Investment banks in the United States were authorised and regulated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Spanish 
counterpart of which is the CNMV (National Securities Market Com-
mission). In 2004 the SEC introduced a consolidated supervision pro-
gramme of which the major investment banks could voluntarily avail 
themselves. The banks were authorised to use internal models to 
estimate the market and credit risks with which they calculated capi-
tal requirements. In exchange, conglomerates had to agree to sub-
ject themselves to the consolidated supervision of the SEC, taking 
the form of so-called Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSEs). Merrill 
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns availed themselves of this arrangement. No lender of last 
resort was assigned to the CSEs, which meant that in order to safe-
guard investment bank customers’ interests, the SEC took on the 
task of monitoring liquidity risk management by these institutions. 
However, the SEC’s supervisory approach, which was more focused 
on the proper functioning of the market and on investor safeguards, 
was not fully attuned to institutions whose business evolved progres-
sively towards raising borrowed funds in order to take proprietary 
positions.
The crisis of confidence that arose further to the subprime loan crisis 
affected investment banks acutely, to the extent that it brought about 
their disappearance under the model known to date.
Thus, in May 2007 the stock market value of Bear Stearns, the fifth-
ranked investment bank in the United States, initiated a declining 
path which was the result of the doubts that emerged on the market 
over its viability, as it was the first institution to announce the liquida-
tion of several hedge funds. According to information provided by the 
SEC, Bear Stearns at all times kept its regulatory solvency ratio at 
over 10%, and satisfactorily passed the liquidity tests required of it. 
However, the market’s differing assessment of the risk relating to as-
sets held by Bear Stearns meant that its sources of financing on the 
markets dried up. The situation ultimately led to the purchase of this 
bank by JP Morgan in March 2008.
In the wake of the problems assailing Bear Stearns, the Federal Re-
serve opened its discount window in March 2008 to investment 
banks through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). This facility 
enabled investment banks to obtain funds as it enhanced the liquidity 
of a broad range of collateral instruments in the event of market fi-
nancing problems. In July 2008, the Federal Reserve and the SEC 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to formalise the supervisory 
powers of the former over investment banks insofar as these have 
access to federal funds through the PDCF. 
The crisis continued in September 2008, and Lehman Brothers filed 
for the biggest bankruptcy in US history, Merrill Lynch was taken over 
by Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley ap-
plied to become commercial bank holding companies (BHCs), sub-
ject to the supervision of the Federal Reserve. Coordinated action 
was also undertaken by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury and the 
ECB to ensure the liquidity of the system at all times.
This crisis clearly illustrates how, against a backdrop of highly interrelat-
ed financial markets, a greater appreciation of risk can drastically worsen 
the liquidity position of institutions that depend on wholesale market 
funding. This high degree of interrelatedness compounds the uncer-
tainty already in place in the financial system and has obliged central 
banks across the world to take measures on an unprecedented scale.
BOX 2.1THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES: THE CASE OF INVESTMENT BANKS
IN THE UNITED STATES
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solidated balance sheet, it has remained practically unchanged. Further, this percentage is in 
line with Spain’s relative weight in the euro area as measured by the ratio between the reserve 
requirement for Spanish banks and that for the area as a whole. This has remained the case 
despite the fact that, on 15 October, the ECB announced that it will meet all demands for li-
quidity, at a fixed rate, without limits. Further, when considering the liquidity that the Eurosys-
tem offers in different currencies, and not only in euro, that obtained by the Spanish banking 
system has even fallen in relation to its relative size.
ASSETS JUN-08
CHANGE
JUN-08/
JUN-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-08
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 54,668 -5.4 2.7 1.6
Loans and advances to credit institutions 285,037 1.7 7.5 8.4
General government 55,847 11.6 1.5 1.6
Other private sectors 2,276,661 9.1 66.7 67.0
Debt securities 349,911 6.2 10.7 10.3
Other equity instruments 92,118 -18.8 3.2 2.7
Investments 47,883 51.3 1.6 1.4
Derivatives 112,797 29.4 2.8 3.3
Tangible assets 36,648 5.4 1.1 1.1
Other (a) 85,577 16.5 2.2 2.5
TOTAL ASSETS 3,397,147 8.0 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Financing to private sector 2,394,642 9.5 70.1 70.5
Financing to general government 202,058 0.7 6.2 5.9
Total doubtful assets 38,511 116.1 0.7 1.1
Total doubtful assets ratio 1.30 65.0 (c)
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 45,646 17.5 1.3 1.3
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY JUN-08
CHANGE
JUN-08/
JUN-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-07
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-08
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 66,311 63.3 2.8 2.0
Deposits from credit institutions 505,077 8.2 14.1 14.9
General government 81,588 -2.0 2.7 2.4
Other private sectors 1,521,034 9.8 44.3 44.8
Marketable debt securities 666,488 3.6 19.9 19.6
Derivatives 129,969 23.3 3.2 3.8
Subordinated debt 83,384 9.3 2.4 2.5
Provisions 32,802 -5.9 1.0 1.0
Other (a) 109,800 -11.8 3.3 3.2
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,196,453 8.0 93.7 94.1
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Eurosystem net lending (b) 47,077 1.33 1.39
Minority interests 10,292 75.5 0.3 0.3
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity 3,245 -85.5 0.5 0.1
Own funds 187,157 20.4 5.4 5.5
TOTAL EQUITY 200,694 9.3 6.3 5.9
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,397,147 8.0 100 100
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including 
valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b.  Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds 
delivered in absorbing operations.
c. Difference calculated in bp.
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As a result of an exceptionally convulsed international financial environment, in which numer-
ous funding markets are still not operational, consolidated balance sheets reflect moderate 
growth of marketable securities issues. Spanish deposit institutions issued both senior debt 
and mortgage covered bonds, capitalising on the issuance opportunities which appeared, al-
beit discontinuously, on the international markets (for example, in 2008 Q2).
Also, customer deposits, particularly those of the private sector, are growing more rapidly than 
the total balance sheet. What is more, partly due to the lower demand for credit and partly due 
to the greater efforts to attract customer funds, deposits are growing faster than loans. The 
growth of fixed-term deposits is particularly strong (around 30% in recent months), which 
makes for a more stable structure than one based on sight deposits. The Spanish banking 
system, based on a traditional retail banking model of long-term relationships with customers 
and with significant cross-selling of other savings products (investment funds, life insurance, 
etc.), has a greater capacity to attract deposits.
Finally, mention should be made of the positive performance of accounting own funds, which have 
grown at a rate of 20.4% and whose weight in the consolidated balance sheet has risen to 5.5%.
The weight of business abroad decreased slightly with respect to June 2007 to stand at 
19.9% of total assets at consolidated level. The increasingly diversified international presence 
of Spanish institutions, which has increased significantly in Europe and in the United States, 
compared with that in the emerging countries, particularly in Latin America, helps to explain 
the low risk profile of overall assets abroad (Chart 2.1.A). 
However, the financial turmoil is having a very significant impact on many international financial 
institutions. The difficulties facing these institutions are related to their high degree of leverage 
and to their notable exposure to non-transparent structured products which are difficult to 
value, linked to US subprime loans. Many of these exposures were held through structures 
which were off banks’ balance sheets, so their progressive return to those balance sheets is 
generating additional pressure on banks’ own funds. These international institutions are book-
ing very sharp write-downs of their assets which have forced them to raise fresh capital (Chart 
2.1.B). Among the most affected institutions are the large investment banks (Box 2.1), some 
of which have been absorbed by other banks with universal business models, while others are 
in the process of liquidation and yet others have been converted into commercial banks.2
It should be noted that the Spanish banking sector has not been affected by this initial impact 
derived from the international crisis. This is because of the banking model followed by Spanish 
institutions, focused on retail operations and having little in common with the originate-to-
distribute model. They thus avoided complex structured products, off-balance-sheet positions 
via certain vehicles (conduits and SIVs3), exposures to monolines and incentives to generate a 
subprime mortgage segment, inexistent in Spain.
However, like numerous European and US banks, Spanish deposit institutions are faced with 
a second-round impact derived from a significant weakening of economic activity, which is 
more pronounced than expected in the major European countries, including Spain. This sce-
nario of greater economic weakness is interacting with the blockage of a most significant part 
of banks’ wholesale funding mechanisms in the face of the liquidity strains persisting on inter-
Securities issuance grew 
moderately because of the 
difficulties in international 
funding markets…
…, but the traditional retail 
business of Spanish 
institutions allows them to 
step up deposit taking at a 
pace which exceeds that of 
lending growth.
The weight of accounting 
own funds in the balance 
sheet has increased.
The subprime crisis is 
having a notable direct 
impact on some 
international institutions…
… although this is not the 
case with Spanish 
institutions which, due to 
their business model, have 
not suffered any direct 
impact,…
… but, along with other 
banking systems, they are 
confronted with a much 
more complex economic 
situation, in view of the
2. Box 2.2 of the April 2008 FSR described the major challenges awaiting these institutions in the future, contrasting them 
with the institutions following a traditional banking model of taking deposits from the public. 3. Box 1.1 of the April 2008 
FSR explains these and other terms relating to the current financial crisis.
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national funding markets. Hence Spanish institutions, despite not having been directly im-
pacted by the subprime crisis, have to operate in a much more complex environment than in 
previous years.
In keeping with the trends noted in previous FSRs, credit to the resident private sector in Spain 
continued to slow in the first half of 2008, with year-on-year growth of 11% (16.6% in Decem-
ber 2007). This trend had started at the end of 2006 (with growth still running at 25.8%), as 
lending adjusted to a situation which, particularly in the real estate sector, began to show signs 
of slower expansion. Banks’ greater caution in assessing risks and the persistence of liquidity 
tensions on the international front add further elements of restraint on the credit supply side. 
In the coming quarters, lending can be expected to continue in this slower growth vein. The 
latest available data at the time of this FSR being drafted (September 2008) point more in this 
direction, with a further slowdown to a 8.3% in year-on-year terms.
By sector, the slowdown in lending in June 2008 is observed both in financing to households 
and in that to companies (Chart 2.2.A). For households, financing for house purchases and for 
other purposes (basically consumer credit) slowed to similar extents (from 18.5% in June 2007 
to 8.4% in June 2008 and from 16.1% to 5.1%, respectively). The latest information available 
for September confirms the foregoing trends for companies overall and also for households. 
For non-financial corporations, although growth is easing, this moderation is pronounced 
among construction and property development companies (from 35.5% in June 2007 to 
10.3% in June 2008), given the difficulties this sector is experiencing, although the slowdown 
in financing to other firms (from 19.7% to 14.8%) is also significant, and is most likely to have 
continued in Q3. The differing sectoral behaviour of corporate credit is contributing to rebal-
ancing the change in total credit to firms (Chart 2.2.B). This rebalancing is a sign of the incipi-
Credit to the private sector 
continues to slow…
persistent international 
liquidity strains.
… more sharply in the 
sectors which had enjoyed 
the most rapid growth in 
recent years…
SOURCES: Bloomberg and Banco de España
a. Weighted average of default probabilities. An explanation of the calculation of the risk profile
of assets abroad can be found in Estabilidad Financiera,  No 7, November 2004.
b.  Spain is not included because there have been no write-downs related to the US subprime crisis.
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ent but slow process of bank balance sheet restructuring undertaken by Spanish deposit in-
stitutions. Thus the annual flows of credit (new credit granted) show that this restructuring 
process is leading to lower lending to the sectors which had enjoyed the strongest growth in 
the past (construction and property development and house purchases). In any event, and as 
indicated, this dynamic will be hampered insofar as the complex situation on the international 
wholesale funding markets persists.
The growth rate of the doubtful assets of the resident private sector in Spain has quickened 
with respect to that reported in the previous FSR. Given that the level of doubtful assets was 
very low after a prolonged period of economic expansion (the total doubtful assets ratio was 
0.61% in December 2007), the rates of change include a scale effect which limits their ana-
lytical usefulness in the present situation.
The doubtful assets ratio of the total credit in Spain extended by deposit institutions amounted 
to 1.14% in June 2008, reaching 1.82% in September. Most of these bad debts arose from 
lending to the resident private sector (households and firms) and the doubtful assets ratio of 
this credit segment (77% of total credit) was the highest (2.54% in September 2008). Other 
lending (to financial institutions, general government and non-residents) showed very low and 
stable doubtful assets ratios throughout 2008 (Chart 2.3.A).
The rise in bad debts has been rapid and particularly sharp in recent months in credit to the 
resident private sector. Conceivably, in the next few quarters the doubtful assets ratio will con-
tinue on an upward trend, thereby converging with that of other EU banking systems which 
traditionally have had a significantly higher doubtful assets ratio (Chart 2.3.B).4
… and more moderately for 
non-financial corporations 
not related to the real estate 
sector. This re-balancing 
illustrates the process of 
restructuring of bank 
balance sheets which, 
however, is hampered by 
the liquidity strains on 
international markets.
The doubtful assets ratio 
has risen sharply…
… and will continue to rise 
in the coming quarters…
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The factors explaining the rise in bad debts are diverse and they are acting simultaneously. 
Thus the increases in bad debts seen in the past and which will continue in the coming months 
will be the combined effect of a weaker macroeconomic situation and of other factors unre-
lated to it. Therefore these increases are not all due to the greater weakness of the real econ-
omy, but are also caused by the extra prudence introduced by the new Accounting Circular 
CBE 4/2004, which requires doubtful assets to be recognised more fully and more promptly.
As noted in the previous FSR, the doubtful assets ratio is increasing more notably in the sectors 
which enjoyed the most rapid credit growth in the past, given the natural lag between this variable 
and the appearance of defaults. Thus it is the construction and property development sectors 
which, since December 2007, have suffered the largest rise in this ratio, up from 0.58% to 1.99% 
in June 2008 (Chart 2.3.C). This rise was also seen in credit for house purchases (from 0.69% to 
… partly because of the 
economic situation and partly 
because of the new 
accounting rules, which are 
more prudent in the 
recognition of doubtful assets.
Doubtful assets are growing 
more rapidly in the sectors 
which had enjoyed stronger 
credit growth in the past.
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1.28% in June 2008). Real estate development activities, by their very nature, incorporate a more 
marked cyclical profile. Past experience shows that, in this respect, their doubtful assets ratio 
usually stands, at times of greater economic weakness, at a level around twice the average ratio. 
However, much of the financing extended to developers is secured and has been earmarked for 
specific developments as these were in progress. In any event, managing exposure to the real 
estate sector is one of the most complex tasks facing Spanish credit institutions.
The impact of the worse economic situation and of the higher interest rates is apparent not only 
in the doubtful assets ratio, but also in an analysis of the default rate curves. These curves have 
risen generally, and the rise bears no relation to when the loans were granted. This indicates that 
there have been no significant adverse selection problems at the time of origination during the 
last three years in the Spanish credit market. In other words, given that the rise is similar regard-
less of the origination date, it can be interpreted that the rate of impairment seen is uniform for 
all of them, suggesting the existence of common factors (the cycle), rather than a relaxation of 
credit standards at some time in less stringent conditions (as in the case of US subprime mort-
gages). Moreover, this general rise is consistent with that observed in the doubtful assets ratio.
Comparison of the Spanish mortgage market with that of the US enables it to be concluded 
that these are markets with very different structural characteristics. As is natural when the 
economy worsens, the doubtful assets ratios grow (Chart 2.4.A). Beyond this, there are no 
other similarities, among other reasons because Spain does not have a subprime segment 
nurtured by weaknesses in the so-called originate-to-distribute model. Hence developments 
in the US subprime segment (Chart 2.4.B), which has default ratios of 25% in the loans ex-
tended since 2005, is not comparable with any segment of the Spanish mortgage market, with 
a default ratio for all mortgages taken together of around 1%.
Nonetheless, it is possible that the Spanish mortgage market may contain segments where 
higher levels of risk are taken on because the institutions face a higher uncertainty as to the future 
behaviour of borrowers that may find themselves in difficulty. An example of this is the segment 
of mortgage lending to foreign residents.5 Although its weight in Spanish deposit institutions’ 
mortgage portfolios is low (6.9% in June 2008), it might experience more delinquency as a result 
of the aforementioned uncertainty when it comes to granting loans (largely because this is a busi-
ness segment that has been less explored in the past). Thus, analysis of the default curves 
shows that the rate of new defaults is higher for resident foreigners than for the overall portfolio, 
as is also the level of these curves (a high of around 3%). Having said that, once again the rise in 
doubtful assets is a general phenomenon not associated with particular loan origination dates, 
which is consistent with the impact of a poorer economic situation. Comparison of Spanish 
mortgage loans to foreign residents with US intermediate quality loans (Alt-A) shows notable dif-
ferences, with the latter having much higher doubtful asset levels (the highs of the curves are 
around 10%). Therefore, the Spanish mortgage market does not have business segments com-
parable to either subprime or Alt-A quality loans. In short, although these loans have default 
characteristics different from traditional ones, the default levels are far below US subprime and 
their small weight in total credit reduces the significance of these differences even further.
House purchase lending, which accounts for a large share of total credit to the resident private 
sector (36%), has historically shown the lowest bad debts of all bank credit. Various factors 
explain this, reflecting the borrower’s incentive to comply with his credit obligations. Thus 
many households are purchasing what for them is an extremely important asset, both because 
They are also growing due 
to the worse economic 
situation and the higher 
interest rates…
… although no problems of 
adverse selection when 
loans were being granted 
have been detected.
The Spanish mortgage 
market bears no relationship 
to that of the US,…
… and the more vulnerable 
credit segments, the bad 
debts of which are rising 
more rapidly due to the 
adjustment of the economy,
… are not comparable even 
with US Alt-A quality loans.
The characteristics of house 
purchase lending in Spain 
explain its historically low 
doubtful assets ratios,…
5. This category includes both resident immigrants and other borrowers such as, for example, retired foreigners who have 
taken up residence in Spain.
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of its value and because of its purpose (principal residence). It should also be kept in mind that, 
unlike in other countries, the percentage of house ownership in Spain is very high. Further-
more, under the Spanish legal system, unlike that of, for example, the US, the non-payment of 
mortgage debt is not satisfied by the delivery of the mortgaged asset (if the value of the house 
is less than the debt), but rather the borrower is liable with the rest of his assets until the debt 
has been repaid in full. In addition, the buy-to-let business, in which the risk of house price falls 
is ultimately assumed by the institution, is practically non-existent,6 nor is it common in Spain 
to use the mortgage collateral to finance consumer credit, based on the house price appre-
ciation in recent years, as is customary in other countries.
These features mean that the probability of default and the loss given default for house mort-
gage loans are usually very low, even in cases of sharp deterioration of the economy (as in 
1993, with unemployment rates above 20% and the budget deficit at 6.7% of GDP, well above 
the current levels). In contrast, owing to its characteristics, consumer credit usually has higher 
default rates, and its doubtful assets ratio in June 2008 was 3% (Chart 2.3.B).
As indicated above, apart from the credit-related developments in the past and the particular 
characteristics of the financing granted, the factors explaining the rise in bad debts also in-
clude changes in the accounting rules applied by credit institutions and in the regulations on 
the declaration of corporate insolvency. Thus the new accounting rules in effect in Spain since 
the beginning of 2005 affect the level and the growth rate of the doubtful assets ratio. Spe-
cifically, new Accounting Circular (CBE 4/2004) takes a more prudent approach and requires 
… and the low losses in the 
event of customer default.
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6. Spanish institutions have valued these transactions on the basis of the expected cash flows rather than at the collat-
eral value of the property involved in the transaction. Other markets prefer to take the appraised value of the collateral 
(and its expected price appreciation), a practice which makes this product very risky. The institutions which originate 
transactions of this type do so with the intention of renewing the mortgage loan after a certain agreed period, on the 
expectation that the house price will have risen. However, if the price moves in the opposite direction, the risk returns to 
the institution.
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an earlier and fuller recognition of doubtful assets than its predecessor (CBE 4/1991). Moreo-
ver, this increased level of stringency is not linear over time, but rather is designed so that, as 
the doubtful assets ratio increases, its effect becomes greater (Box 2.1 of the May 2007 FSR). 
Thus, and faced with the same economic circumstances, the new Accounting Circular has, 
compared with its forerunner, two effects. First, and on a permanent basis, it raises the level of 
the doubtful assets ratio. Second, the speed at which this ratio rises increases. Accordingly, 
and in step with the pace of deterioration in the real economy, the new Accounting Circular will 
involve greater levels for the doubtful assets ratio, and swifter rates of increase. In this respect, 
it is estimated that since December 2007 the increase in the doubtful assets ratio for this rea-
son has been around 10%, and its relative importance will grow in the coming quarters.
Meanwhile, the current insolvency law provides incentives to company managers to call for a 
creditors’ meeting at an earlier stage, thereby bringing forward the impact of bad debts on 
institutions, although this effect is very difficult to quantify.
This simultaneous action of diverse factors will continue in the coming quarters, so a part of 
the increase in bad debts will reflect a less favourable economic situation, but another part will 
be caused by the aforementioned regulatory changes. The increases in the doubtful assets 
ratio derived from the more prudent regulatory approach are conducive to enhanced transpar-
ency in disclosures by institutions and mean that earnings will be set aside for bad debts.
To assess the rise in bad debts, not only must the simultaneous impact of the causal factors 
be considered, but it must be set in a historical context so as to analyse, first, the loan loss 
provisions set aside by the institutions to cope with it and, second, the recurring income which 
enables the higher write-downs to be absorbed.
A broad historical perspective (the last 20 years) allows for a better assessment of the rise in 
doubtful assets ratios in the last year (Chart 2.5.A). The differences between the current start-
ing situation and that in the early 1990s, before the last Spanish recession, are very significant. 
To begin with, the Spanish economy has benefited from joining a more stable region like the 
euro area here. Thus, previously, nominal interest rates were higher and the public finances 
and employment were in a significantly worse situation. In addition, credit institutions have 
improved their control and credit risk management models. However, this historical compari-
son must be made with caution, not only because not all economic cycles are the same, but 
because of the uncertainty surrounding the global economic situation.
These considerations affect not only the level of the doubtful assets ratio, which is currently 
lower than at the beginning of the 1990s, but also its degree of dispersion among institutions 
(Chart 2.5.B). This dispersion is growing as a result of the differing impact of the economic 
situation on the various credit policies pursued by institutions in the past. 
The existence of an ample loan loss provision accumulated through stringent general provision-
ing in the previous expansionary phase of the cycle means that the increase in bad debts has 
had an early and progressive impact on the results of Spanish deposit institutions. Hence insti-
tutions can withstand a significant deterioration in bad debts without their income statements 
being so adversely affected, as would occur in the absence of such a system of provisions.
By definition, the funds set aside through a general provision such as that in Spain are designed 
to be used when bad debts rise, as at present. This is being seen in the current year, in which 
the coverage ratios have decreased significantly (to 114% in June 2008) and will foreseeably 
continue converging towards the average levels prevailing in EU banking systems (around 
Bad debts are also rising 
because the new 
accounting regulations, 
which are more prudent, 
recognise doubtful assets 
earlier and more fully, and 
because of the incentives 
introduced by the new 
insolvency law.
Hence, given the same 
behaviour of the real 
economy, bad debts will 
now reach higher levels 
more rapidly because the 
regulations induce greater 
transparency and mean 
earnings will be set aside for 
bad debts.
Although each cycle has its 
own particular features, bad 
debts are far from being as 
high or widespread as in 
1993, and the same goes 
for the starting 
macroeconomic conditions.
Also, the loan loss 
provisions in place give 
room for manoeuvre,…
… since, by definition, the 
general provision is 
designed to be used when 
bad debts increase.
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50%). Provisions for loan losses can be seen to decline in all countries when defaults rise sig-
nificantly.7 The general loan loss provisions were set up in the past to be used in circumstances 
like those at present, and not to increase permanently the funds available to institutions. 
To determine the effective level of coverage of credit risk losses, it must be taken into account 
that the loss given default (LGD) is generally lower than the total amount of the doubtful assets. 
The lending in Spain, particularly that which has grown most strongly in recent years, is secured. 
From the standpoint of credit risk management, this allows institutions greater flexibility and 
more room for manoeuvre. In this respect, the LGD of a loan to a property development com-
pany is appreciably lower than that which would be recorded in another type of loan (for exam-
ple, one secured by a specific asset of the company, which rapidly deteriorates and becomes 
obsolete, or one which is completely unsecured, the recovery of which depends solely on the 
willingness/ability to pay of the borrower, without any room for manoeuvre for the institution).
Assuming a level of bad debt coverage similar to the European average (around 50%, which 
takes the LGD into account), and taking into account the current level of the loan loss provi-
sion, this provision would enable banks to cover the losses associated with a doubtful assets 
ratio of around 4%. If to this is added the margin offered by the income statement, this cover-
age ratio boosted by one year’s profits would enable doubtful assets ratios of around 7% to be 
covered. Alternatively, if three-quarters of the profits of two consecutive years are added, the 
loss coverage would reach doubtful assets ratios of 9%. Naturally, this is a scenario of consid-
erable stress for income statements.
Credit risk is not the only risk which institutions have to manage. As a result of the interna-
tional financial crisis, the access to funding on the wholesale markets has become more com-
plex for financial institutions. The recent events involving US investment banks, one of the 
world’s major insurance companies (AIG) and US money market mutual funds, coupled with 
A good part of the financing 
which grew most strongly in 
the past is secured, which 
allows greater flexibility in 
managing the credit risk.
The provisions in place 
enable coverage of the 
losses associated with 
doubtful asset ratios higher 
than the current ones, and 
more so if the recurring 
nature of bank income is 
taken into account.
The liquidity tensions persist 
on international financial 
markets.
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the movements in stock market prices and their high volatility and the difficulties of certain 
large European banks, evidence episodes of severe instability on international financial mar-
kets that are now affecting the ability of non-financial corporations to access funds.
In recent years Spanish institutions have turned to the medium- and long-term wholesale fi-
nancial markets to finance some of their growth. This equipped them with a more flexible fi-
nancial structure in the benign conditions prevailing on international financial markets. 
The funding from the wholesale markets was raised through a wide range of financial instru-
ments, and avoided the complex structured products that have proved problematic due to 
their lack of transparency and the difficulties in valuing them. 
Also, the diversification of issuance terms and, in particular, the prevalence of medium- and 
long-term maturities (the outstanding medium- and long-term balance is more than six times 
the short-term funding received), although more costly than short-term funding on the money 
markets, has enabled Spanish institutions to achieve greater stability in their wholesale fund-
ing. Thus, even within medium- and long-term funding (excluding notes), the long maturities 
clearly predominate: 3.8% of the outstanding balance in July 2008 falls due at the end of this 
year, 36% matures between 2009 and 2012, with maturities spread evenly over those years, 
and the remaining 60% matures after 2013 (Chart 2.6.A). 
In the current year Spanish deposit institutions were, despite the difficulties, able to issue on 
the market some €36 billion of unsecured financial debt (€22 billion) and mortgage covered 
bonds (€14 billion). In the circumstances currently prevailing on the international financial mar-
kets, not only the volumes, which were concentrated mainly in Q2, but also the large number 
of institutions gaining access to the wholesale markets, were significant.
However, the access to these markets, both for Spanish institutions and for those of other EU 
countries, has not been continuous or smooth, but has rather taken place when opportunities 
have arisen to place instruments with investors highly reluctant to take risks and preoccupied 
with their own efforts to restructure portfolios and financing sources. This illustrates the sever-
ity of the current difficulties, with these markets – which were deep and liquid until mid-2007 – 
having almost completely ground to a halt. The Spanish government’s action plan, which is part 
of that decided on by the euro area countries, should – insofar as it provides State backing to 
institutions’ issues – contribute to re-opening funding possibilities for Spanish institutions.
Two factors explain the quality of the portfolios securitised by Spanish institutions. First, the port-
folios are highly granular (i.e. composed of many small diversified loans) and generally have 
moderate LTVs (ratio of the value of the mortgage loan to that of the house being financed, which 
stands at an average of around 70%). Second, the securitisation structures used are very simple 
and implemented through asset-backed securities which, given their lack of complexity and high 
transparency, are far removed from those of other banking systems. Contributing to this is the 
concept that Spanish institutions have of securitisation, since, rather than considering it as a 
business in itself, they regard it as an additional source of funding, so most of the risks have re-
mained on bank balance sheets. Thus, apart from avoiding the serious problems of incentives in 
origination and subsequent loan monitoring encountered in the US, the bonds resulting from 
securitisation processes in Spain have a notable credit quality (on average 93% are triple A).
Given the current levels of mortgage bad debts in Spain (1.28% in June 2008), it is unlikely that 
credit portfolio defaults will affect the higher-quality bonds. Considering, as mentioned above, 
that the higher credit quality tranche includes 93% of the bonds issued, these would only suffer 
The wholesale funding 
received by Spanish deposit 
institutions…
… avoided the products 
which are now giving 
trouble…
… and has a maturity 
structure substantially 
slanted towards the long 
term.
Market placements by 
Spanish institutions took 
advantage of the particular 
opportunities available on 
the market…
... but difficulties persist at 
present, 
difficulties that should be 
alleviated by the State 
backing to institutions’ 
issues.
The mortgage portfolios 
securitised by Spanish 
institutions are characterised 
by their granularity and by 
the simplicity of the 
structures used.
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losses when the probability of default on the mortgage loans, assuming a LGD of 50% (very high 
for Spain since in the previous recession this loss was practically zero), rose to 14% (28% if the 
LGD were 25%), a level which is well removed from even that recorded in 1993 (mortgage 
doubtful assets ratio of 4%), the year of the last Spanish economic crisis. For a loan with a LTV 
below 80% and a LGD of 50%, house prices would have to fall by more than 60% for there to 
be losses. This is a very severe stress scenario with a very low probability of occurrence. It should 
also be taken into account that this type of stress testing, valid for Spain, cannot be conducted 
in those banking systems in which successive securitisations have been carried out, since the 
underlying assets are not granular and the probability distributions are not homogeneous.
Against this background, Spanish institutions have reacted rapidly to strengthen their tradition-
ally sound customer deposit base. This was made possible largely because of their character-
istic business model. Spanish banks engage in typically retail business, and so have close ties 
with their customers. These bonds, which are strengthened by banks’ proximity to customers 
through their extensive office network, enable long-term relationships to be established. Also, 
Spanish banks have a proven ability to adjust the mix of savings products offered to their cus-
tomers (deposits, investment funds, life insurance, etc.). 
The traditional Spanish retail 
banking model is making it 
possible to restructure 
liabilities by increasing 
deposits taken from the 
public,…
Hence it is hard to conceive 
that the higher-rated bonds, 
which includes practically all 
of them, will be affected by 
the increase in bad debts, 
even in highly adverse 
scenarios.
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The structural characteristics of the Spanish banking system are helping institutions to restruc-
ture their balance sheets. In the past year, banks have attracted a significant volume of fixed-
term deposits, with growth rates of around 30% (Chart 2.6.B). The increase in fixed-term de-
posits meant that their relative weight rose with respect to sight deposits. This, albeit at a 
higher cost, lends greater stability to their liability structure. Also, it can be considered that 
funds have also been received from investment funds (Chart 2.6.C). Even so, and as men-
tioned throughout this FSR, the difficulties in obtaining funding on international markets make 
for considerable additional difficulties for Spanish institutions. The plan announced by the 
Spanish government, which is part of the euro area countries’ action plan, should contribute 
to alleviating these difficulties (Box 1.2).
This restructuring of liabilities, along with the slower lending growth, means that the difference 
between new funds loaned and those raised (new loans less new deposits) has progressively 
narrowed, with the deposits taken from households exceeding the lending to this sector in the 
first half of 2008 (Chart 2.6.D).
Despite the complex developments on financial markets and the significant economic slow-
down in Spain, the income statement of Spanish deposit institutions continues to be charac-
terised by recurring items, particularly if it is compared with that of other EU banking systems. 
The recurring nature of their business is underscored by the scant dependence of their income 
on financial market performance.
Group net income was somewhat higher at €15,100 million for the period up to June 2008, 
slightly (2.5%) less than for the same period of 2007 (Table 2.2). The slight fall in profit is partly 
explained by the more complex environment in which institutions operated and by the strong 
performance in the first half of 2007 when, moreover, various large institutions made one-off 
sales of some of their investments. Further, it should be kept in mind that business abroad is 
negatively affected when it come to converting its results to euro, due to exchange rate 
trends.
In line with the slight fall in profit, the return on equity (ROE) decreased uniformly across insti-
tutions (Chart 2.7.A), from 21.5% in June 2007 to 17.7% in June 2008. Despite the decline, 
the current levels of ROE are very high and clearly exceed the yield on public debt (Chart 
2.7.B).
The recurring nature of income statement items can be seen in the sound performance of its 
three main margins (Chart 2.7.C) and, in particular, in that of the net interest margin (tradi-
tional retail business) and of operating expenses, which mitigate the stagnation of fees and 
commissions and the notable growth of loan loss provisions (Chart 2.7.D). 
Net interest income grew by 13.5% (5 bp in terms of ATA, to 1.88%), and this despite the 
slowdown in activity and higher funding costs. Unlike those of other countries, Spanish banks 
have a large percentage of loans extended at variable rates (Chart 2.8.A), which enables them 
to adjust interest rates more rapidly to the general market risk premium, keeping a stable 
spread between marginal lending and deposit rates (Chart 2.8.B). The persistence of tensions 
on international financial markets will mean that funding costs will continue to exert downward 
pressure on net interest income. 
Operating expenses are still growing at a high rate (8.3%), albeit one lower than that of gross 
income (9.7%), which prompted a slight change in the efficiency ratio from 44.6% in June 
2007 to 44.1% in June 2008. This development was general in deposit institutions, particu-
… particularly fixed-term 
deposits which, although 
more costly, are more 
stable.
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
The income statement 
continues to consist largely 
of recurring items,…
… and despite the slight fall 
in profit…
… profitability remains high.
The recurring nature of 
income can be seen in the 
three main margins…
… and particularly in net 
interest income, which 
reflects the persistence of 
income and the ability to 
adjust interest rates to the 
general market risk 
premium.
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larly the larger ones (Chart 2.9.A). Operating expenses decelerated slightly in business in Spain 
(from 9.1% in June 2007 to 8% in June 2008), particularly administrative expenses, while the 
contribution of staff costs and depreciation to the total rate of change was similar to that in the 
previous year. The June 2008 data (Chart 2.9.B) showed that banks have begun to act on 
those expenses where they have most room for improvement in the short term (advertising 
and publicity), but that office openings (3.8% in June 2008) and new employee hires (4.2% in 
June 2008) continue to grow.
These data show that there is room to act on operating expenses. What is more, given the 
current circumstances of banking business, institutions should strive more to reduce their 
operating expenses. Such efforts would range from rationalising their operations and the 
level of their cost structure, to harnessing the economies of scale that might arise from any 
future banking consolidation processes. In any event, and whatever the strategy chosen by 
each institution, the outcome should lead to greater cost efficiency. The rigorous control of 
costs should contribute to softening the impact which, in the coming years, the write-down 
of doubtful assets and the lower rate of expansion of banking activity will exert on earn-
ings.
The sluggishness of fees and commissions, a trend which foreseeably will not reverse in the 
short term, is explained basically by the smaller volume of securities services and non-banking 
product sales, as well as by the lower growth of collection and payment service fees, probably 
due to the policy of reduction followed by numerous banks and to the lower volume of busi-
ness.
Finally, to explain the decrease in group net income, given the growth of 10.5% in net operat-
ing income (unchanged as a percentage of ATA), account must be taken of the notable 
Institutions should step up 
their efforts to rationalise 
operating costs.
Fees and commissions have 
not grown,…
… but loan loss provisions 
have surged.
JUN-08 JUN-07 JUN-08
€m
% CHANGE
JUN-08/
JUN-07
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 83,686 23.7 4.82 5.41
Financial costs 54,610 30.0 3.00 3.53
Net interest income 29,076 13.5 1.83 1.88
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted
for using the equity method 2,541 18.9 0.15 0.16
Net commissions 11,025 -0.1 0.79 0.71
Gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities 5,983 8.0 0.40 0.39
Gross income 48,625 9.7 3.16 3.15
Operating expenses 21,429 8.3 1.41 1.39
Other operating income 677 -0.9 0.05 0.04
Net operating income 27,873 10.5 1.80 1.80
Asset impairment losses 8,479 63.0 0.37 0.55
Provisioning expense (net) 1,195 14.0 0.07 0.08
Other income (net) 1,463 0.6 0.11 0.10
Profit before tax 19,662 -3.8 1.46 1.27
Net income 15,996 -1.2 1.15 1.03
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Group net income 15,149 -2.5 1.11 0.98
INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2008
growth (63%) of asset impairment losses, practically all of which were due to loan losses. This 
reflects the increase in specific provisions as a result of the rising bad debts, and, although 
the general provision has countered some of this effect, it has not done so to a greater extent 
because numerous banks have pursued a policy of prudence and have kept recording provi-
sions.
As mentioned throughout this FSR, although Spanish banks face a much more complex pe-
riod, they must harness the room for manoeuvre available to them to alleviate difficulties. From 
the standpoint of the income statement, this is so because of the strong starting position.
This starting position is discernible on comparing the results of the Spanish banking system 
with the EU average (the latest available data are as at December 2007). It can be seen that 
Spanish banks are more profitable and efficient (Chart 2.10.A). Contributing to this are the re-
curring nature of their traditional retail business and their cost management ability.
Compared with the EU, the 
starting position is good.
ROE AND OPERATING INCOME ITEMS
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Second, as mentioned above, avoiding the direct impact of the subprime crisis means that 
there is now extra room for manoeuvre. Comparison of the major banks’ earnings perform-
ance in the first half of 2008 shows that the Spanish institutions performed better (Chart 
2.10.B). These differences are reflected in their share prices, which fell less sharply than those 
of the large members of other banking systems (Chart 2.11.A), although the perception as to 
This is reflected in the better 
stock market performance, 
although the perception of 
credit risk is similar to that of 
other financial systems.
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their credit risk, which is rising, is similar to that of other international banks, and appreciably 
lower than for US banks (Chart 2.11.B).8 
The implementation of the measures agreed by the EU countries on the shoring up of credit 
institutions’ capital would, if they were applied to institutions not undergoing solvency prob-
lems, have an unwanted negative effect. This is because they would hamper the discriminating 
capacity of financial market agents among institutions, which might hinder the return of the 
former to a normal footing.
Despite a positive performance both at absolute level and comparatively with other banking 
systems, there are downside risks to the earnings performance of banks, particularly because 
of the expected increase in loan loss provisions. In any event, banking is a cyclical business, 
so the high returns of the recent past cannot be expected now that the economic and financial 
environment has turned much more unfavourable. 
The recent transposition of the EU Capital Requirements Directive to Spanish law meant that 
deposit institutions obliged to report their solvency situation to the Banco de España did so for 
the first time in June 2008 in accordance with the New Capital Accord (Basel II) criteria.
In June 2008, the overall solvency ratio for deposit institutions stood at 11.3%, while the tier 1 
ratio was at 7.7%. In both cases, Spanish deposit institutions are comfortably above the regu-
latory minimum requirements.
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
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8. The risk premiums derived from the CDSs of other smaller Spanish institutions should be regarded with much caution 
because the liquidity of this market is usually very low, and the same can be said of its transparency.
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Compared with June 2007, both the total solvency ratio (from 10.6% to the above-mentioned 
figure of 11.3%) and the tier 1 ratio (from 6.9% to 7.7%) trended favourably (Chart 2.12.A). This 
favourable solvency performance, and in particular of the ratio that reflects the highest-quality 
capital, has come about notwithstanding the fact that Spanish banks are not expected to 
significantly improve their capital ratios as a result of this regulatory change. This is because of 
the prudent criteria with which this process of transition is being implemented.
The strength in terms of solvency of Spanish banks can also be seen when other measures of 
capital are analysed, measures which, though not subject to regulatory requirements, are 
taken into account by the market when analysing bank positions, since they consider the 
highest-quality capital elements. Thus, the core capital ratio, i.e. the ratio of capital plus re-
serves to risk-weighted assets, was 9.12% in June 2008. If intangible assets (essentially good-
will in the case of Spanish banks) are stripped out the ratio, it still stands at a comfortable 
level (7.14% in June 2008).
The solvency position of Spanish banks compared with that of other European banking sys-
tems stands around the mean, and all the more so when funds set aside as general provisions 
are considered (Chart 2.12.B). However, as recent events have highlighted, very high ratios, 
including those of the most basic capital measure, have not prevented deposit institutions 
from various European countries from undergoing notable difficulties, necessitating, in one 
way or another, intervention by the public authorities. Indeed, several institutions that have 
needed such help were amongst the highest-ranked, before the international financial crisis 
unfolded, in terms of their capital ratios. This probably reflects the insufficiency of capital re-
quirements for certain types of assets, in particular those included in the held-for-trading port-
folio which, as has been indicated, incorporates a high credit risk. It also reflects the existence 
of off-balance sheet vehicles, which have tightened capital requirements above what the previ-
ous figures showed.
In this respect, the current situation has shown that deposit institutions’ level of leverage is, 
notwithstanding other considerations, also very important. For overall Spanish deposit institu-
Attesting to the soundness 
of Spanish banks’ solvency 
is their core capital ratio,...
Both the total ratio at the 
tier 1 ratio of comfortably 
above regulatory minimum 
requirements. 
There was an improvement 
on June 2007, despite the 
prudent criteria with which 
the transition to Basel II is 
being implemented.
... and international 
comparisons.
Some international banks 
with high solvency ratios 
have had to be bailed out, in 
one form or another, which 
evidences the limitations of 
solvency ratios for certain 
assets included in the held-
for-trading portfolio and the 
existence of off-balance 
sheet structures
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tions, this level of leverage stands at around 4.8% when tier 1 capital is set in relation to total 
assets. When capital plus reserves is considered, this ratio stands at 5.7% and rises to 6.7% 
when general provisions are taken into account. 
The soundness of Spanish banks in terms of their leverage is evident when compared with 
the situation of the biggest European banks (Chart 2.12.C). In terms of core capital, the infor-
mation available is more limited, but the relative strength of Spanish institutions is corrobo-
rated.However, set against the current uncertainty over both developments in the world 
economy and in the main financial markets, the shoring up of capital is a factor that banks 
should analyse thoroughly.
This analysis has been prepared without considering the measures that various European 
governments are implementing to provide more capital to a good number of their biggest 
banks (e.g. in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France). If these measures are not 
carefully designed and explained to the market, so that banks that have not shown any sol-
vency problems are also favoured, the level playing field of competition could be perverted, 
while distortions would be introduced that would make financial markets agents’ task of dis-
criminating among banks more complex. Counterproductive effects would thus be generated, 
Spanish banks are in a 
leading position 
internationally.
This is why leverage ratios 
are important.
The recapitalisation by some 
governments of banks that 
apparently have no solvency 
problems may distort the 
level playing field. At the 
same time, there are doubts 
as to whether the 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
jun-02 jun-03 jun-04 jun-05 jun-06 jun-07 jun-08
 SPANISH TIER 1 RATIO
 SPANISH SOLVENCY RATIO
%
A.?SOLVENCY RATIOS
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
ylatI
niap
S
nede
w
S
detin
U
modgni
K
muigle
B
sdnalrehte
N
ecnarF
dnalrezti
w
S
yna
mre
G
%
C.?TIER 1 TO TOTAL ASSETS, BY COUNTRY
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
dnalrezti
w
S
muigle
B
niap
S
yna
mre
G
detin
U
modgni
K
sdnalrehte
N
ecnarF
nede
w
S
ylatI
 TIER 1
 GENERAL PROVISION
%
B.?TIER 1 TO RISK WEIGHTED ASSETS,
BY COUNTRY
SOLVENCY AND LEVERAGE CHART 2.12
SOURCES: Banco de España and company reports.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2008
hampering the return of financial markets to a more normal footing. Moreover, there are doubts 
over how the features of the instruments used to recapitalise banks square – according to the 
agreements by EU heads of state and the applicable Community directives – with the features 
that should characterise both tier 1 and core capital. Specifically, cumulative preference shares 
clearly belong to the tier 2 capital category. 
From an international perspective, the difficulties besetting the insurance sector are plain in the 
case of one of the world’s largest insurers (AIG), and the need for public intervention evidenc-
es their deep impact on the financial system. Also, in the international arena, the concern 
about the monolines noted in the previous FSR has not dissipated.
For Spanish insurance companies, the exposures both to complex products lacking in trans-
parency which have proven to be problematic and to monolines are estimated to be insignifi-
cant. Hence their balance sheet structure, in which the weight of equities instruments is slight 
(Chart 2.13.A), helps to mitigate the adverse effects derived from international market develop-
ments.
Nonetheless, Spanish companies, despite their high profitability (ROE of 26.4% and ROA of 
2.6% in 2007) and high solvency margin (195% in life insurance and 343% in non-life in 2007), 
have to face the difficulties derived from a more unfavourable economic conjuncture in a much 
more complex financial environment.
Thus the automobile insurance sector, which has benefited from the decrease in claims, has 
been negatively affected by the drop in car sales and by the effect of inflation on the cost of 
vehicle repairs. Meanwhile, the fall in house sales has had a negative effect on the new multi-
risk home insurance, on life insurance linked to house purchase mortgages and on payment 
protection insurance in case of unemployment.
2.2 Insurance companies 
and mutual funds
The international insurance 
sector faces a more 
complicated environment, 
although Spanish 
companies have a very 
limited exposure to the 
problematic products.
instruments being used in 
such recapitalisation 
processes can be 
considered best-quality (tier 
1 or core) capital.
The starting position is 
good, although they have to 
face a more difficult 
economic situation,…
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Furthermore, the life insurance business has been faced with strong competition from de-
posit institutions to attract household savings.
This increased competitive pressure from deposit institutions also affects investment funds 
(sharp decrease in net subscriptions), which, together with the difficulties on international fi-
nancial markets (lower returns), helps to explain the decline in investment funds’ net assets 
(Chart 2.13.B).
… and heightened 
competitive pressure to 
attract household savings,…
…which also affects 
investment funds.
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3 Infrastructures
On 4 September, the Eurosystem announced changes in the risk control measures applied to 
the eligible collateral for its credit operations with counterparties. These measures will come 
into force in February 2009. The collateral framework set in place by the Eurosystem has con-
sistently proven sound and efficient. As previously highlighted in the November 2007 FSR, the 
admission of a wide range of eligible assets has been a differential feature that has contributed 
favourably to the resilience of financial markets in the current circumstances.
Nonetheless, in a collateralisation framework in which asset eligibility is essentially deter-
mined by relatively general principles, it is important to check periodically that the features 
and parameters of the risk control framework are in line with actual market circumstances. 
The changes announced by the Eurosystem are part of the regular review made every two 
years. These reviews enable relevant information drawn from the financial markets to be up-
dated in order to bring risk control policy into line. Consequently, further to the international 
financial turmoil, these changes also include the lessons learned during the current market 
situation. 
The changes are considered to be technical adjustments, with the essence of the Eurosys-
tem’s collateral policy being retained. The changes can, concisely, be grouped under the fol-
lowing headings. First, the valuation haircuts applied to the various instruments accepted as 
collateral will be increased.1 Second, transparency requirements in the rating of asset-backed 
securities are to be stepped up. Third, the definition of “close links” is extended to include 
situations in which a counterparty submits an asset-backed security as collateral when it (or 
any third party that has close links to it) provides support, in specific circumstances, to that 
asset-backed security.2 Finally, the Eurosystem may, if required, and notwithstanding compli-
ance with formal requirements, limit or exclude the use of certain assets as collateral for its 
credit operations, doing so also at the level of individual counterparties.
The increase in valuation haircuts for specific instruments entails updating the level of haircuts 
it is deemed appropriate to maintain for marketable assets that were included in the less liquid 
categories. In the specific case of asset-backed securities, the observation that the prices of 
these assets had declined significantly in various markets, including over short periods of time, 
appeared to warrant an increase in their haircuts. The uniformity of the new level of haircuts, 
irrespective of the maturity or coupon structure of the bond, responds to the fact that risk in 
this type of product is more closely linked to the underlying assets, whose maturities are gen-
erally in the long term, than to the asset-backed securities themselves. The increase in the 
haircuts on non-collateralised bank paper is due to the greater risk concentration that this as-
set introduces. The introduction of a 5% reduction to the theoretical value of asset-backed 
securities that lack a market price is in response to the loss of liquidity of this instrument, which 
means that its theoretical valuation is subject to greater uncertainty, given the lesser availabil-
ity of market prices that can be used as a reference for its intrinsic value. 
New Eurosystem risk 
control measures
In February 2009, the 
Eurosystem will change 
its collateral admission 
arrangements which, 
although they have 
proved sound,…
… are reviewed every 
two years and will on 
this occasion include 
lessons learned as a 
result of the turmoil.
The essence of collateral 
policy is retained, with 
the changes being of a 
technical nature.
1. These measures may be summarised as: (i) increase in haircuts applied to asset-backed securities for all maturities 
and coupon structures, up to 12%; (ii) additional 5% markdown to that previously existing for fixed-income instruments 
issued by credit institutions (other than collateralised bank bonds); (iii) asset-backed securities to which a theoretical 
value is assigned (because there is no market price) will be subject to a valuation markdown of 5% of this theoretical 
value. 2. Either by establishing a currency hedge with the issuer or guarantor, or by providing liquidity support for more 
than 20% of the nominal value of the asset-backed security.
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BOX 3.1THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE.
TARGET2 - SECURITIES (T2S)
One of the characteristics of the post-trading1 of securities in Europe 
is its fragmentation into numerous infrastructures. This bears ad-
versely on the efficiency of the industry in respect of financial market 
integration. One particular manifestation of this inefficiency is in cross-
border business, where much higher settlement costs than at the 
national operational level combine with operational difficulties. The 
Eurosystem has a particular interest in this industry owing both to its 
commitment to financial integration in Europe and to financial stability 
considerations. Heightening this interest is its status as a user of the 
post-trading platforms and the very close links between securities 
settlement and cash settlement in central bank cash accounts.
Accordingly, the Eurosystem has been closely monitoring the solu-
tions proposed in the post-trading industry in recent years and, 
against this background, it has taken the initiative to develop the 
TARGET2-Securities (T2S) platform. In July 2008, following ground-
work involving continuous consultation with all the parties involved, 
and bearing in mind the support received from both political and mar-
ket quarters, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank 
took the decision to set the T2S project in train. It further decided that 
the Eurosystem shall be the owner and operator of this platform, 
which will be developed and operated by the central banks of Ger-
many, Spain, France and Italy. The specifications of the platform, 
which will determine the functional and technical design of the sys-
tem, should meet users’ needs. The specifications phase, which 
should conclude in late 2009, will be followed by a fully fledged devel-
opment phase, with T2S expected to come on stream by 2013.
T2S is a very ambitious project whose main aim is the integration of 
securities settlement and the associated cash settlement on a single 
common platform. The platform, on which cash and securities ac-
counts will remain respectively assigned to the central banks and 
central securities depositories, will centralise the settlement of all se-
curities operations in euro (and in other European currencies) in cen-
tral bank money. It is a technical infrastructure shared by all the cen-
tral securities depositories that decide to join the project, which will 
operate under harmonised rules and which will ensure equal treat-
ment and access to all participants. In any event, the central deposi-
tories that join will retain their contractual and business relationship 
with their customers. 
From a financial stability standpoint, T2S represents substantial 
progress in risk containment. The overall reduction in post-trading 
risk that T2S will undoubtedly involve is largely due to its expected 
containment of the scale of legal, settlement and custodial risk, espe-
cially as far as cross-border securities traffic is concerned. Further, to 
mitigate the additional risk that concentrating all settlement in a single 
platform might involve, a series of particularly demanding operational 
risk control measures are to be adopted.
T2S will thus provide for a reduction in principal risks and those risks 
arising from the use of numerous players (custodial chains) involved 
in the settlement of operations, as it enormously simplifies delivery 
versus payment in central bank money.
Settlement risk can also be reduced, since T2S will offer a real-time 
gross settlement service that will be assisted by optimisation mecha-
nisms both on the securities side and the cash side (autocollateralisa-
tion in stocks and flows). These mechanisms allow the advantages of 
net models to be had, as they reduce the liquidity needs proper to 
gross systems without incorporating the risks inherent in these net 
models.
From an operational security standpoint, as T2S is constructed on 
the TARGET2 infrastructure, it will enjoy very high reliability and op-
erational security levels, along with contingency mechanisms and 
back-up systems that will ensure activity re-start and the completion 
of the settlement process in emergency situations. It should be point-
ed out that TARGET2 meets the most demanding international secu-
rity standards. 
With regard to efficiency, the concentration of all securities and cash 
accounts in the same platform will allow for better management of 
participants’ collateral and liquidity. This efficiency will in turn be en-
hanced by the harmonisation of communication protocols and of op-
erational procedures. Also, the T2S platform will generate economies 
of scale and network economies, features proper to this type of infra-
structure, which will result in lower costs, especially in the cross-bor-
der sphere.
In sum, T2S is expected to contribute decisively to the creation of a 
single and more secure securities market, helping reduce collateral 
and liquidity requirements substantially and allowing cross-border 
operating in Europe to reach the same levels of efficiency and secu-
rity it enjoys at the national level. Further, T2S will contribute favour-
ably to containing the systemic risk inherent in securities settlement 
activity, since it incorporates procedures that will enable a substantial 
portion of the risks proper to this type of activity to be mitigated.
1. Securities clearing and settlement.
The requirement of greater transparency in the rating of asset-backed securities and the ex-
tension of the definition of “close links” are a response to certain practices observed in some 
issues of asset-backed securities. Strong dependence of the risk profile of an asset-backed 
security on the counterparty may invalidate its effectiveness as collateral in operations be-
tween the counterparty and the Eurosystem. The explanations given by rating agencies about 
the reasons behind the credit ratings granted to asset-backed securities have subsided sub-
stantially in recent times.
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The overall effect of these measures, which will conceivably reduce the value of the eligible 
collateral available, is limited. This is because the volume of collateral deposited by counter-
parties with the Eurosystem is notably greater than their funding needs. 
In the case of counterparties resident in Spain, the situation is even more comfortable. Possi-
bly, the reduction in the value in eligible collateral will be somewhat higher in percentage terms 
than that estimated for the Eurosystem, since the proportion of asset-backed securities in the 
composition of eligible collateral deposited at the Banco de España is somewhat higher than 
that of the Eurosystem. However, the volume of eligible collateral deposited exceeds the 
amount used in credit operations with the Banco de España by an even steeper proportion 
than that for the Eurosystem: of a volume of collateral of €170 billion, approximately €15 billion 
would have to be deducted, which would still leave €155 billion to guarantee monetary policy 
operations which, at most, have amounted to around €50 billion for the set of counterparties 
resident in Spain. Finally, the extension of the definition of close links in asset-backed securities 
would not affect the counterparties resident in Spain, since such securities deposited by these 
counterparties possess none of the features that would make them ineligible as from 1 Febru-
ary 2009.
The effect of the 
measures will be limited 
in the Eurosystem …
… and even more 
negligible for Spanish 
banks, which have a 
high volume of collateral.
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